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PUNISHMENT ONLY FOR THE POOR: THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF PAY-TO-VOTE
DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS
ABSTRACT
Felony disenfranchisement has remained a longstanding practice in the
United States, utilized by nearly every state in the Union to punish those
convicted of a felony with a bar from the franchise. However, when individuals
attempt to re-obtain their voting rights, individual state restoration systems vary
immensely, with some providing automatic restoration following incarceration
and others requiring payment of legal financial obligations, such as fines or
restitution. In the wake of a constitutional amendment to provide automatic
restoration, the Florida legislature proposed a new system in SB 7066, aimed at
curbing the effects of the amendment. Now signed into law, this new scheme
disallows restoration until the individual has fully paid all fines, fees, and
restitution associated with their sentence. It has since been challenged and was
upheld by the Eleventh Circuit in Jones v. Governor of Florida.
This Comment explores the Eleventh Circuit decision in Jones, positing that
the majority came to an erroneous conclusion by both employing the wrong
classification and wrongfully applying its precedent. Accordingly, noticing the
disastrous effects of these deficiencies in Jones, this Comment argues for a new
path forward in judicial review of payment-based restoration laws, uniting the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on wealth discrimination both within the
criminal justice system and within access to the franchise. Such a union should
require heightened scrutiny for all laws seeking to provide criminal punishments
based on one’s inability to pay due to the law’s intent to criminalize poverty,
especially when such punishments deprive an individual of a right as
fundamental as the one to vote.
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INTRODUCTION
Bonnie Raysor owes $4,260 in outstanding fees and costs related to a felony
conviction and two prior misdemeanor convictions.1 These fees were
“levied . . . in the form of a civil lien.”2 The total is comprised of “court costs,
[the] cost of prosecution, [the] crime stoppers fund, [the] cost of investigation,
[the] drug trust fund, [a] public defender application fee, and [a] public defender
fee.”3 Raysor pays $30 per month towards her balance.4 She has lived in Florida
since she was seventeen and currently lives in Boynton Beach, Florida.5 She
holds a bachelor’s degree in finance and accounting.6 She homeschooled her
three children and now enjoys taking care of her grandchildren, teaching Sunday
school, and working as an office manager.7 Ms. Raysor’s prior convictions stem
from her battle with opioids—a battle that began to cope with her father’s
illness.8 She will be disenfranchised until this amount is paid off in full by 2031,
when she will be seventy years old.9
Steven Phalen “owes approximately $110,000 in restitution, court costs, and
fees” from a felony conviction in Wisconsin state court.10 After losing his father
at five years old, Mr. Phalen used alcohol as a coping mechanism.11 His arson
conviction arose from a split-second decision that he made at twenty-threeyears-old while under the influence of alcohol.12 He “cannot afford to pay back

1
Complaint at 5–6, Raysor v. Lee (N.D. Fla. 2019) (No. 4:19-cv-00301-RH-MJF), consolidated in Jones
v. DeSantis, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1284 (N.D. Fla. 2019) (No. 4:19-cv-00301-RH-MJF) [hereinafter Raysor
Complaint].
2
Id. at 7.
3
Raysor Complaint, supra note 1, at 7; see also FLA. STAT. § 16.555(5)(b)–(d) (2020) (noting that costs
levied under the crime stoppers fund are used to support a jurisdiction’s crime fighting programs through the
award of grants to eligible counties).
4
Id.
5
E.g., id. at 5.
6
Bonnie Raysor, Florida Is Trying to Silence Me with a Poll Tax, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (May 7, 2019),
https://campaignlegal.org/story/florida-trying-silence-me-poll-tax.
7
Id.
8
Id.; Raysor Complaint, supra note 1, at 7.
9
Raysor, supra note 6.
10
See Consolidated Pretrial Brief for Plaintiff at 12, Jones v. DeSantis, 462 F. Supp. 3d 1196 (N.D. Fla.
2020) (No. 4:19-cv-300-RH-MJF) [hereinafter Jones Consolidated Brief]; see also Lawrence Mower, What
Now? Amendment 4, Felon Voting Move to Florida Courts, TAMPA BAY TIMES (July 1, 2019), https://www.

tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2019/07/01/what-now-amendment-4-felon-voting-moves-to-thecourts (“[Phalen]’s paid down more than $40,000 of his $150,000 in restitution and fees so far, but acknowledges
he’ll probably die in debt.”)
11
See Daniel A. Gross, What It Felt Like for a Florida Man with a Felony to Regain His Voting Rights,
NEW YORKER (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/as-told-to/what-it-felt-like-for-a-florida-manwith-a-felony-to-regain-his-voting-rights.
12
Id.

CROLEY_12.15.21

374

12/16/2021 10:51 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:371

his [costs] in full” and cannot seek a community service modification to reduce
his financial obligations due to his out-of-state conviction.13 Mr. Phalen has a
Ph.D. in organizational and relational communications and currently works in
HVAC logistics.14 He is passionate about social rights and social justice and
seeks to promote compassion throughout his life.15 With such high amounts due
and no alternatives available, Mr. Phalen will be disenfranchised indefinitely.
Racquel Wright owes over $72,000 in court fees and a mandatory fine
arising “from a single non-violent drug conviction . . . [over] eight years ago.”16
Her initial fee was $50,000, but it has since grown due to interest accrual.17 She
has been turned down for jobs at 7-11, McDonalds, and Walmart because her
fifteen years as an educator has made her “overqualified.”18 She has a fourteenyear-old daughter who she says taught her everything she knows.19 She “works
part-time as a legal assistant to the Special Counsel to the Florida State
Conference of the NAACP” and volunteers as the Assistant Secretary of her
local branch of the NAACP.20 Although Ms. Wright has attempted to maintain
an active role politically organizing in her own community, she cannot take her
own activism to the ballot box as her criminal debt increases despite her
struggles to satisfy it.21
The three individuals described above are not alone. As of 2016, there are
an estimated 1.5 million Floridians who have been disenfranchised as a result of
a felony conviction.22 Florida’s disenfranchisement accounts for twenty-seven
percent of America’s disenfranchised population.23 Of these 1.5 million
Floridians, at least 750,000 have outstanding financial obligations from prior
convictions.24 Roughly seventy to eighty percent “are indigent and unable to

13

See Jones Consolidated Brief, supra note 10, at 13.
See id. at 12.
15
See Gross, supra note 11.
16
See Jones Consolidated Brief, supra note 10, at 12; Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights,
Remarks by Racquel Wright, FACEBOOK (Feb. 29, 2020), https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=6376201204066
61.
17
Jones Consolidated Brief, supra note 10; see Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, supra
note 16.
18
Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, supra note 16.
19
See id.
20
See Jones Consolidated Brief, supra note 10, at 12.
21
See Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, supra note 16.
22
CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, RYAN LARSON & SARAH SHANNON, SIX MILLION LOST VOTERS: STATE-LEVEL
ESTIMATES OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT, 2016, at 3 (2016).
23
Id.
24
See Patricia Mazzei & Michael Wines, How Republicans Undermined Ex-Felon Voting Rights in
Florida, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/17/us/florida-felons-voting.html.
14
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pay” these amounts.25 The average income of an individual reentering society
after a term of imprisonment is $1,559 per month.26 An internal analysis done
by the Florida Department of Corrections on “22,012 individuals on probation,
parole, or community supervision found that they owed an average of $8,195 in
restitution alone,” not including fines and fees.27 This discrepancy makes
satisfying full amounts nearly impossible. Further, as described more fully
below, even those that may have the resources to pay are unable to fully satisfy
their debts as Florida has not maintained a central database to track these
obligations.28 As a result, many are unaware and unable to determine how much
money they truly owe.29
Senate Bill 7066, passed into law by the Florida legislature, requires full
payment of all legal financial obligations (LFOs) for restoration and is the main
provider of this widespread disenfranchisement.30 Each time an election comes
around, many Floridians, such as Ms. Raysor, are barred from casting a ballot
despite having served their respective sentences and beginning the difficult
process of reintegration. Based on her current trajectory, Ms. Raysor will not be
able to register for another twelve years and will not cast another ballot until she
is seventy years old.31 Despite contributions to their communities, these
individuals remain disenfranchised indefinitely due to the state’s attempt to
provide a lifelong punishment for prior criminal offenses.32 The state burdens
these individuals with a harm for which they can never truly recover as elections
pass them by.33
This Comment aims to address this harm, asking why we permit a justice
system that criminalizes those in poverty to strip away fundamental rights
25
26

Id.
GEO. L. C.R. CLINIC, CAN’T PAY, CAN’T VOTE: A NATIONAL SURVEY ON THE MODERN POLL TAX 22

(2019).
27

Id.
Amy Gardner & Lori Rozsa, In Florida, Felons Must Pay Court Debts Before They Can Vote. But with
No System To Do So, Many Have Found It Impossible, WASH. POST (May 13, 2020), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/in-florida-felons-must-pay-court-debts-before-they-can-vote-but-with-no-systemto-do-so-many-have-found-it-impossible/2020/05/13/08ed05be-906f-11ea-9e23-6914ee410a5f_story.html.
29
Id.
30
See FLA. STAT. § 98.0751(2)(a) (2020).
31
See Raysor Complaint, supra note 1, at 7–8.
32
See State Defendants Brief on Appeal of Preliminary Injunction at 1, Jones v. DeSantis, 410 F. Supp.
3d 1284 (N.D. Fla. 2019) (No. 19-14551) [hereinafter State Defendants Brief on Appeal] (describing the intent
of the legislature as “limit[ing] re-enfranchisement to felons who have fulfilled all terms of punishment imposed
on them, including monetary ones”).
33
Jones v. DeSantis, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1310 (N.D. Fla. 2019) (“When an eligible citizen misses an
opportunity to vote, the opportunity is gone forever; the vote cannot later be cast. So, when a state wrongly
prevents an eligible citizen from voting, the harm to the citizen is irreparable.”).
28
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indefinitely, using Florida’s latest iteration of felony disenfranchisement and its
subsequent challenge in Jones v. Governor of Florida34 as an example.35 Simply
put, the court in Jones got it wrong; therefore, restrictions on access to the
franchise should not turn on wealth-based distinctions; accordingly, such
restrictions demand heightened scrutiny.
Part I of this Comment provides the theoretical lens through which the
argument must be viewed, discussing the criminalization of poverty and how
pay-to-vote felony restoration is the most recent attempt at engraining this theory
within our justice system. Part II begins to contextualize the issue, reviewing the
various types of felony disenfranchisement laws employed across the nation.
Part III will focus on the example of Florida, providing an overview of its
disenfranchisement scheme from inception up to present day and presenting the
appellate history of Jones up to the most recent decision by the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals.36 Part IV focuses on the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Jones,
noting the deficiencies in the majority’s reasoning to provide an example of why
the courts continue to misrepresent payment-based restoration laws and why
current precedent is not sufficient to address these constitutional issues. Part V
utilizes the jurisprudence regarding wealth-based distinctions both within the
rights provided for criminal defendants and within access to the franchise to
design a new framework for reviewing laws that aim to deprive citizens of
fundamental rights on the basis of payment. Lastly, Part VI concludes by
exploring the implications heightened scrutiny would have on both the
individuals who could be re-enfranchised and American democracy.
I.

THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY

Felony disenfranchisement statutes that employ a pay-to-vote scheme are a
symptom of a larger disease embedded in the American legal system—the
criminalization of poverty. Thus, this theory provides the lens through which the
Comment should be read.
The criminalization of poverty can be described as two sides of the same
coin.37 On the one hand, many facets of poverty have been deemed criminal,

34

Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
In the Northern District of Florida, the court referred to the case as Jones v. Desantis. However, as the
case moved to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the name was altered to Jones v. Governor of Florida. For
clarity’s sake, this Comment will refer to the case as Jones.
36
Id.
37
Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon’s Servants and the Criminalization of Poverty, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
445, 446 (2015).
35
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such as the homeless being penalized for sleeping in particular places, working
women losing welfare benefits when unable to locate childcare, and
punishments for “dependence on governmental benefits or informal sources of
income.”38 After being subjected to criminal prosecution, the matter only
worsens, as eighty percent of criminal defendants cannot afford counsel and are
forced to “rely on a public defense system that spends an average of $12 per
capita.”39 So, when these poverty-related crimes force individuals into the
criminal justice system, the results are disastrous.
On the other hand, the criminalization of poverty also encompasses the
notion that “brushes with the criminal system tend to make people poor.”40 This
entails the imposition of fines and fees, as well as the long-lasting effects a
criminal record has upon the ability to access “jobs, credit, and [other]
resources.”41 A conviction—even those associated with misdemeanor crimes—
“necessarily diminish[es] one’s earning capacity and employment prospects, as
well as one’s eligibility for other social goods, such as professional licenses,
some public and subsidized housing, and other public benefits.”42
Moreover, with less access to resources within civil society and the loss of
access to public benefits,43 those in poverty will utilize the “oddly beneficial
functions of the penitentiary,” such as “job-placement and drug treatment
programs, mental health services, domestic violence shelters, and individual and
family counseling.”44 Similarly, the American welfare system has begun to
assert criminality on the front-end by “assum[ing] the criminality” of its
recipients and pursuing heavy surveillance of those enrolled.45 The system has
thus demonstrated a “greater willingness to spend money to police the poor,”
rather than alleviate their struggles.46 Not only does this criminalization of
poverty target the poorest of society, it also reinforces this poverty after
convictions or terms of incarceration, creating a cycle from which it is difficult

38

See id.
Alexandra Natapoff, The Penal Pyramid, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 71, 79 (Sharon
Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017).
40
See Natapoff, supra note 37, at 446.
41
Id.
42
Bridget McCormack, Economic Incarceration, 25 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 223, 227 (2007).
43
MARC MAUER & VIRGINIA MCCALMONT, A LIFETIME OF PUNISHMENT: THE IMPACT OF THE FELONY
DRUG BAN ON WELFARE BENEFITS 7 (2013).
44
MEGAN COMFORT, DOING TIME TOGETHER: LOVE AND FAMILY IN THE SHADOW OF THE PRISON 182
(2008).
45
See KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
POVERTY 1, 58–59 (2011).
46
Id. at 59.
39
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to escape.47 Such a cycle has created an under-class, relegating many poor
individuals to a second-class citizenship by stripping them of their power to
participate in the legal and political system.48
As stated above, a large facet of the criminalization of poverty involves the
concept that contact with the criminal justice system tends to exacerbate poverty,
primarily through the imposition of user fees associated with the adjudication
system.49 Some of these financial obligations include probation oversight fees;
tether fees in driving; drug testing costs; reimbursement fees to police,
prosecutors, and public defenders; application fees to request a public defender;
and the costs of court-ordered programs.50 These costs are levied without
acknowledgement of the financial status of the defendant, despite there being
little evidence of their effectiveness as a deterrent.51
In Florida, the fees imposed are the same whether a defendant is convicted
of a violent or a non-violent felony or whether the defendant admits guilt or
pleads no contest.52 On average, these fees include $50 for an application for a
public defender, “$100 for actual representation by [that] public defender,” $100
minimum for the state’s attorney, and “$225 as ‘additional court costs’” ($25 of
which goes into the State’s General Revenue Fund)—leaving each defendant
with $475 in fees alone.53 This does not include any fines or restitution
additionally imposed during sentencing.54 The costs associated with public
defense are levied even if defendants have demonstrated indigency, “requir[ing]
a convicted defendant to pay the state back for the expense of providing the
attorney.”55 When accounting for more than just user fees, the average amount
of restitution totals $17,872; if disregarding those who owe “extraordinarily high

47
McCormack, supra note 42, at 241–42. This cycle can be seen in the way defendants often face the
difficult choice of enduring incarceration or taking on greater LFOs. Id.
48
See Natapoff, supra note 39, at 79 (finding eighty percent of criminal defendants cannot afford
counsel). In terms of felony convictions aggravating one’s poverty, “[r]eentering citizens in Florida have an
estimated monthly income of $1,559.” See GEO. C.R. CLINIC, supra note 26, at 22.
49
McCormack, supra note 42, at 227.
50
Id. For example, treatment programs cost around $250 to $500, probation fees are roughly $20 a month,
drug screenings (often required in probationary periods) cost $25 a week, and recovery costs to the police,
prosecutor, and public defender can range from $100 to $300. Id. at 234. These fees are often in addition to any
fines assessed as a result of the actual crime committed. Id.
51
Id. at 227. At times, these pay-or-stay systems may actually have the adverse effect, encouraging
individuals to pursue more illicit ways to quickly find funds to avoid incarceration. Id. at 239–40.
52
See FLA. STAT. § 938.05(1).
53
Jones v. DeSantis, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1297 (N.D. Fla. 2019).
54
Id.
55
Id.
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restitution,” the average still amounts to $8,195.56 One re-entry program
reported their clients had LFO debt that ranged from $100 to $300 a month.57
If defendants are unable to pay these fees, there are often two potential
consequences: (1) additional fines for late payments or failure to pay, or (2)
incarceration.58 Even defendants who attempt earnestly to make payments can
be incarcerated or made to pay the entire amount the day they appear in court—
often referred to as “pay-or-stay” schemes.59
Ultimately, poverty has created a schism in how the criminal justice system
functions for different individuals, described as a “penal pyramid.”60 At the top
of the pyramid is “the world of federal offenses, serious cases, and wellresourced defenses.”61 This is far different from the “sprawling bottom,” where
“offenses are petty and caseloads number in the thousands.”62 Whereas rules
prevail at the top, in this bottom portion “outcomes are driven by institutional
practices and inegalitarian social relations.”63 The bottom of the pyramid
contains “overworked public defenders who ‘meet and plead’ their clients in
mere minutes,” perpetuating mass injustice and allowing debtors’ prisons to
thrive.64 Defendants have fewer resources and less access to counsel, and those
who cannot make bail “languish in jail for months and may eventually plead
guilty just to get out.”65 Some defendants will choose to be incarcerated rather
than be burdened by the imposition of fines—knowing they could handle a stint
in jail but would be destroyed by thousands of dollars in LFOs.66
Already bound to our criminal justice system, this pervasive ideology has
found its home within rights restoration schemes across the country. As
discussed later, ten states indefinitely deny the right to vote to those with felony
convictions until these individuals have fully paid off their LFOs.67 In Florida,
56
REBEKAH DILLER, THE HIDDEN COST OF FLORIDA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES 11 (2010). This data was
aggregated from a 2005 internal analysis completed by the Florida Department of Corrections of the 22,379
individuals on probation, parole, or community supervision who owed restitution. Id.
57
Id. at 10.
58
McCormack, supra note 42, at 234.
59
Id. at 235–36.
60
Natapoff, supra note 39, at 71–72.
61
Id. at 72.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. See generally ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW DEBTORS’ PRISONS (2010)
(providing an overview of incarceration for unpaid debts following a yearlong investigation).
65
Natapoff, supra note 39, at 78.
66
McCormack, supra note 42, at 241–42.
67
MARGARET LOVE & DAVID SCHLUSSEL, WHO MUST PAY TO REGAIN THE VOTE: A 50-STATE SURVEY
4 (2020).
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these costs are assessed regardless of outside factors like the individual’s
culpability.68 Thus, defendants who cannot afford to pay for their own attorney
are saddled with thousands of dollars in LFOs.69 Furthermore, many of these
individuals are unaware that their felony conviction and subsequent LFOs will
affect on their ability to cast a ballot.70 When the court system upholds these
statutes conditioning restoration on payment, those unable to pay can only
reacquire their voting rights by winning the lottery, as one former felon
suggested.71
The criminalization of the poorest among us is so divorced from the rule of
law and so devoid of justice that it requires an evaluation of its predominant
nature within civil society: why do we permit this system to strip away the
fundamental rights of so many individuals indefinitely? More importantly, does
the U.S. Constitution permit this apparent debt-based restoration?
II. FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND RIGHTS RESTORATION
THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY
Felony disenfranchisement schemes are not unique to Florida. In 1776,
Virginia became the first state to include a law in its state constitution stripping
away the political rights of those convicted.72 By the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment, twenty-nine states had adopted laws denying the right to vote to
those with felony convictions, arising as a means to suppress Black voters in the
Reconstruction Era.73

68
Jones v. DeSantis, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1297 (N.D. Fla. 2019) (“Florida law requires the judge to
impose fees [with a] primary purpose . . . to raise revenue . . . [with] no apparent relationship to culpability.”).
69
LOVE & SCHLUSSEL, supra note 67, at 68–69.
70
See, e.g., The Daily, The Field: The Fight for Voting Rights in Florida, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/02/podcasts/the-daily/voting-rights-florida-election.html. In an interview
with Julius Irving. a former felon now working to help register individuals to vote in Florida, reporter Nick
Casey asked, “Did anybody explain to you what rights you were going to lose with a felony charge, with a drug
charge?” Julius responded, “Nah not really. No, sir.” The conversation continues, with Casey stating, “And I
don’t imagine you were thinking about voting at that point.” Julius responds, “Not at all, not even a little bit. At
that time, voting was probably the farthest thing from my mind.” Id. at 10:31–10:51.
71
Patricia Mazzei, Floridians Gave Ex-Felons the Right to Vote. Lawmakers Just Put a Big Obstacle in
Their Way, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2019, at A11. In this New York Times story, Coral Nichols—who owes $190,000
in restitution—said she would be unable to register to vote for the rest of her life “unless [she] won the lottery.”
Id.
72
George Brooks, Felon Disenfranchisement: Law, History, Policy, and Politics, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
851, 853 (2005).
73
Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the Criminalization of Debt, 117
PENN. ST. L. REV. 349, 360–61 (2012). For more about the use of felony disenfranchisement laws in the Jim
Crow Era and the racial dimensions of felony disenfranchisement, see generally Bailey Figler, A Vote for
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Today, forty-eight states—all but Maine and Vermont—have some form of
felony disenfranchisement laws; thus, those without indefinite
disenfranchisement to employ a process for an individual to re-obtain their
voting rights.74 Ten states in total deny restoration indefinitely until payment of
LFOs are complete.75 Three states—Alabama, Arkansas, and Florida—deny the
vote indefinitely until all LFOs are paid.76 Five states—Arizona, Georgia,
Kansas, Texas, and Tennessee—deny restoration based upon repayment of
certain LFOs, such as only requiring full payment of restitution.77 Lastly, two
states—Connecticut and South Dakota—deny enfranchisement indefinitely for
unpaid LFOs based on certain types of convictions.78
Particularly, in Tennessee, the legislature instituted a system in which
eligibility for restoration is contingent upon full payment of restitution, court
costs, and child support obligations.79 Under this system, former felons are
required to be current in support payments before registering.80 Despite a
Democracy: Confronting the Racial Aspects of Felon Disenfranchisement, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 723
(2006).
74
LOVE & SCHLUSSEL, supra note 67, at 4. Additionally, D.C. does not employ a disenfranchisement
scheme. Id.
75
Id. at 4.
76
Id.; see ALA. CODE § 15-22-36.1 (2020) (requiring the person applying for voter eligibility to pay “all
fines, court costs, fees, and victim restitution ordered by the sentencing court at the time of sentencing on
disqualifying cases”); ARK. CONST. amend. 51, § 11 (“It is the duty of any convicted felon who desires to register
to vote to provide . . . proof . . . [they] ha[ve] paid all probation or parole fees . . . [and] all applicable court costs,
fines, or restitution.”); FLA. STAT. § 98.0751(2)(a) (2020) (defining the “[c]ompletion of all terms of sentence”
required for enfranchisement as including “[f]ull payment of restitution” and “[f]ull payment of fines or fees
ordered by the court as a part of the sentence or . . . as a condition of any form of supervision,” even upon
“conversion to a civil lien”).
77
LOVE & SCHLUSSEL, supra note 67, at 4. Arizona provides for automatic restoration “if the person pays
any victim restitution imposed.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-907(A). Georgia’s law requires those who have been
convicted of a felony to register to vote upon “completion of the sentence,” which has been interpreted to include
payment of fines imposed by statutory authority. See GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-216 (2020); 1984 Ga. Op. Att’y
Gen. No. 84-33, 1984 WL 59904. Kansas law renders those with felony convictions ineligible to vote until “such
person has completed the terms of the authorized sentence.” See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6613(b). Although the
statute does not explicitly condition repayment, Kansas law permits payment of restitution or fees to be a
condition of probation, and as of 2018, the Secretary of State has not allowed registration of those with
outstanding LFOs related to restitution, probation, and parole related fees. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-6611,
21-6607; Beth A. Colgan, Wealth-Based Penal Disenfranchisement, 72 VAND. L. REV. 55, 66–67, 67 n.44 (2019)
(citing Telephone Interview with Jameson Beckner, Assistant Dir. of Elections, Kan. Sec’y of State (June 6,
2018)). Texas conditions enfranchisement upon fines associated with the sentence, not court costs and restitution.
See TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 11.002 (2020). Lastly, Tennessee conditions restoration of voting rights upon full
payment of restitution, court costs, and child support obligations. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-29-202 (2020).
78
LOVE & SCHLUSSEL, supra note 67, at 4. Connecticut conditions denial on federal and out-of-state
convictions. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-46a(a). South Dakota’s LFO-based denial applies to all convictions
after June 30, 2010. See S.D. COD. LAWS § 12-4-18; S.D. ADMIN. R. 5:02:03:24.
79
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-29-202 (2020).
80
Id.
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challenge before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the law was
upheld on the basis that wealth-based classifications do not invoke a suspect
class and the law shared a rational relationship to the state’s interest in collecting
child support.81
However, the majority of states do not condition restoration on the basis of
repayment. Thirty-six states and the District of Columbia do not employ
schemes that allow outstanding LFOs to deny enfranchisement indefinitely.82
Seventeen states provide for enfranchisement immediately after incarceration.83
Furthermore, “sixteen states allow LFOs to delay enfranchisement” but not
necessarily indefinitely.84 Lastly, four states restore by discretionary powers
embodied in state constitutions.85
As an example, Iowa’s system has seen recent changes allowing for the
inclusion of two restoration systems working simultaneously.86 First, the
governor has signed an executive order permitting automatic restoration for nonviolent former felons who were not convicted under Iowa’s “Homicide and
Related Crimes” chapter after “discharge of sentence.”87 Discharge of sentence
refers to “completion of any term of confinement, parole, probation, or other
supervised release.”88 For those convicted of a violent felony under the
“Homicide and Related Crimes” chapter of the Iowa code, the state operates a
clemency system.89 Within the clemency system, eligibility for restoration is
conditioned upon discharge of probation or parole, and the “applicant must have
completed repayment of court costs, restitution, and fines, or must be current on

81
Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 746, 747, 750 (6th Cir. 2010). This law was upheld by the Sixth
Circuit despite there being no evidence that child support payments are in any way related to one’s criminal
charge. See id. In its evaluation of the Fourteenth Amendment claim, the Sixth Circuit failed to address voting
as a fundamental right that may invoke heightened scrutiny. Id. at 746.
82
LOVE & SCHLUSSEL, supra note 67, at 4.
83
Id. Those states are Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Utah. Id.
84
Id. Those states are Alaska, California, Delaware, Idaho, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. Id.
85
Id. Those states are Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Virginia. Id.
86
Voting Rights Restoration, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF IOWA, https://governor.iowa.gov/services/
voting-rights-restoration (last visited Nov. 16, 2021).
87
Id.
88
Id. Governor Reynolds promised “to continue to advocate for a constitutional amendment,” codifying
this automatic restoration. See Press Release, Kim Reynolds, Governor of Iowa, Gov. Reynolds Signs Exec.
Ord. to Restore Voting Rts. of Felons Who Have Completed their Sentence (Aug. 5, 2020), https://governor.
iowa.gov/press-release/gov-reynolds-signs-executive-order-to-restore-voting-rights-of-felons-who-have.
89
Voting Rights Restoration, supra note 86.
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a payment plan.”90 Iowa’s system is unique in that it still requires the state to
receive repayment of these fees and fines but allows for enfranchisement before
the total amount is paid off in full. On the contrary, systems like Florida’s, which
require full payment before allowing registrations, create a burden that could
take an individual their entire life to meet.91
III. FLORIDA’S RIGHTS RESTORATION FRAMEWORK: PAST AND PRESENT
Florida has experienced fluctuations within its felony disenfranchisement
and rights restoration system since its inception in 1868. However, one thing
within its operation has remained consistent—once the will of the people
expands the grant of restoration permitting more Floridians to cast their ballot,
the state quickly implements a reversion.
This Part details this complicated history, beginning in section A. Sections
B and C discuss the historic passing of Florida Amendment Four, the status of
felony registrations in Florida in the months that followed, and the legislature’s
culling response in SB 7066. Section D focuses on the subsequent challenge of
the statute in Jones, whose progeny has formed the basis of this Comment.
A. The History of Florida’s Restoration Scheme
Florida’s legal system has employed some form of felony
disenfranchisement since 1868.92 Article XIV, Section 2 of Florida’s 1868
Constitution first “imposed a lifetime voting ban for people with felony
convictions.”93 Within the same article, the Constitution “directed the legislature
to ‘enact the necessary laws to exclude from . . . the right of suffrage, all persons
convicted of bribery, perjury, larceny, or of infamous crime.’”94 Many historians
note that this felony disenfranchisement provision arose shortly after Florida
was required to pass the Reconstruction Amendments.95 This version of
Florida’s felony disenfranchisement law remained until 1968, when the state

90

Id. (emphasis added); see infra Part III.C.
See id.; see also Raysor Complaint, supra note 1, at 2, 7, 10–11, 14 (detailing the struggles of various
individuals to satisfy their LFO debt).
92
ERIKA L. WOOD, FLORIDA: AN OUTLIER IN DENYING VOTING RIGHTS 1, 5 (2016), https://www.
brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Florida_Voting_Rights_Outlier.pdf.
93
Id.
94
Id. (quoting FLA. CONST. art. XIV, § 2 (1868)).
95
See id. at 5–7. These specific crimes were the same crimes echoed in the sentiments of Florida’s Black
Code, which aimed to systematically subjugate Black Americans in response to the passage of the
Reconstruction Amendments. Id. at 4–5.
91
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drafted a new constitution.96 The 1968 Constitution eliminated the delineation
of specific crimes and maintained blanket disenfranchisement, rewriting the law
to read, “No person convicted of a felony . . . shall be qualified to vote . . . until
restoration of civil rights.”97 This began the era of clemency-based restoration.98
From 1968 to 2018, Florida’s constitutional disenfranchisement provision
remained the same. This disenfranchisement scheme has been regarded as
“unique” in that it left those with felony convictions permanently
disenfranchised until the individual took action toward restoration.99 Despite the
provision containing the same language, those with felony convictions
experienced a series of fluctuations when attempting to reacquire their voting
rights. In 1974, the Florida legislature intended to provide automatic restoration
following the completion of parole or release from custody; however, in an
advisory opinion, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the law, claiming it
“unconstitutionally infringed upon the constitutional power of the Governor . . .
to restore civil rights.”100 Thus, this first attempt to provide restoration
exemplifies the framework for disenfranchisement in Florida for years to
come—when the will of the people trends towards restoration, the state provides
a course correction offering restrictions as a reversion.
This framework continued between 1975 and 1991. Those formerly
incarcerated experienced near automatic restoration as the only requirement was
to apply and prove eligibility.101 Here, eligibility included “completion of all
sentences imposed and all conditions of supervision.”102 However, in 1991, the
state added a new requirement—a hearing—and by 1999, the crimes requiring a
hearing before restoration had increased.103 However, by 2007, Governor
Charlie Crist began to tilt the balance once again, attempting to clarify and
streamline the restoration process.104 Under his leadership, those convicted of
non-violent crimes were not required to take any action nor petition; rather, the
96

Id. at 7.
Id.
98
Id.
99
Allison J. Riggs, Felony Disenfranchisement in Florida: Past, Present and Future, 28 J. C.R. & ECON.
DEV. 107, 107–08 (2015). To have one’s rights restored during this time, an individual was required to file an
application with the State to approve eligibility for enfranchisement. Until 2018 when Amendment Four was
passed, this process often required a hearing before the Clemency Board. Id. at 109; see also infra Part III.B
(explaining how Amendment Four aimed to transform Florida’s restoration system).
100
Id. (citing In re Advisory of the Governor of C.R., 306 So. 2d 520, 524 (Fla. 1975)).
101
Id.
102
See FLA. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM. ON C.R., EX-FELON VOTING RIGHTS IN FLORIDA 24
(2008).
103
Riggs, supra note 99, at 109.
104
Id. at 110.
97
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Parole Commission “would send a list of [those] eligible” to the Clemency
Office, and those individuals could bypass a hearing or investigation.105
As previously noted, these swings towards restoration were nearly always
met with a retreat. By 2011, under the leadership of Governor Rick Scott, the
Clemency Board voted unanimously to restrict the restoration process, resulting
in two new rules.106 The first rule applied to those convicted of a violent felony
and required a seven year wait after completion of their sentence to petition for
restoration, and then involved an investigation and hearing before the Clemency
Board.107 The second rule applied to those convicted of non-violent crimes; this
required a five year wait but did not always require a hearing.108 Under these
rules, if denied restoration, an applicant was required to wait two years before
reapplying.109 Further confounding the difficulty of this process, the Clemency
Board only met quarterly, which led several former offenders to experience
delays far more than the required five or seven year waits.110 During this period,
the Board was reported to “ha[ve] a backlog of more than 10,000 applications”
and averaged only 400 restorations per year.111 Throughout Rick Scott’s first
seven years as governor, only 3,000 individuals had their rights restored as
compared to the 150,000 individuals who had their rights restored during the
tenure of his predecessor.112 It was this disastrous operation that offered a
moment for activists to achieve real movement on defeating indefinite
disenfranchisement and providing for automatic restoration.

B. The Enactment of Amendment Four
By 2018, Floridians for Fair Democracy had gathered 799,000 signatures,
enough to surpass the 766,000 threshold needed to get Amendment Four on the

105
Id. However, this process was still not considered automatic. It still required an approval by the
Clemency Board, and thus many of these individuals experienced delays in restoration due bureaucratic backlog.
Id. at 110–11.
106
Id. at 111.
107
Id.; Fla. R. Exec. Clemency 10(A) (2011). The Clemency Board was made up of Governor and three
Cabinet officials. See Riggs, supra note 99, at 110.
108
Riggs, supra note 99, at 111; see Fla. R. Exec. Clemency 9(A) (2011).
109
Fla. R. Exec. Clemency 14 (2011).
110
Riggs, supra note 99, at 111.
111
Langston Taylor, Most Ex-Felons Can Register to Vote Tuesday if All Terms of Their Sentence Are
Met, MIA. HERALD (Jan. 4, 2019, 4:46 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/statepolitics/article223934775.html.
112
Greg Allen, Felons in Florida Want Their Voting Rights Back Without a Hassle, NPR (July 5, 2018,
7:23 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/05/625671186/felons-in-florida-want-their-voting-rights-back-without-ahassle.
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ballot.113 After the Florida Supreme Court approved the language, the
amendment’s text was the following:
(a) No person convicted of a felony, or adjudicated in this or any other
state to be mentally incompetent, shall be qualified to vote or hold
office until restoration of civil rights or removal of disability. Except
as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any disqualification from
voting arising from a felony conviction shall terminate and voting
rights shall be restored upon completion of all terms of sentence
including parole or probation.114

In short, this Amendment sought to provide individuals with automatic
restoration after completion of their sentence, including terms of parole and
probation. After appearing on the ballot in the 2018 midterms, the Amendment
passed with almost sixty-five percent of the vote—a clear demonstration of the
will of the voters.115
After Amendment Four’s historic passing, those formerly incarcerated
emerged in troves to register to vote, eager to participate in upcoming elections.
It is estimated “[n]early 100 times more formerly incarcerated Floridians
registered in the first three months of 2019 than in previous odd years,” with
more than 2,000 registrations in those three months alone—“that is roughly ten
times the annual average number of registrations” for those formerly
incarcerated prior to Amendment Four’s passage.116
C. Senate Bill 7066 and the Institution of a Pay-to-Vote System
Despite this overwhelming victory for restoration, the Florida legislature and
Governor DeSantis responded quickly to cull the effects of the Amendment.117
113
Steven Lemongello, Floridians Will Vote This Fall on Restoring Rights to Former Felons, S. FLA. SUN
SENTINEL (Jan. 23, 2018, 4:40 PM), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/florida/fl-reg-felon-voters-amendment20180123-story.html. Floridians for Fair Democracy was led by Desmond Meade—a former felon himself who
earned a law degree after serving his sentence. After achieving this great feat, Meade said: “The moment I found
out, tears just started streaming down my face . . . . As someone directly impacted, I cannot quantify the level of
emotions moving through me right now.” Id.
114
Constitutional Amendment Petition Form, FLORIDIANS FOR A FAIR DEMOCRACY, INC. (2014),
https://dos.elections.myflorida.com/initiatives/fulltext/pdf/64388-1.pdf. The italicized portion indicates the text
seeking to be added to the Constitution.
115
Voting Restoration Amendment 14-01, FLA. DIV. OF ELECTIONS (2018), https://dos.elections.myflorida.
com/initiatives/initdetail.asp?account=64388&seqnum=1.
116
Kevin Morris, Thwarting Amendment 4, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 1–2, 4 (2019), https://www.
brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/2019_05_FloridaAmendment_FINAL-3.pdf.
117
Letter from Ron DeSantis, Governor of Fla., to Laurel Lee, Fla. Sec’y of State (June 28, 2019),
https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/6.282.pdf (informing Secretary Laurel Lee of the signing
of SB 7066 and referring to the passing of Amendment Four as a “mistake”).
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SB 7066 was passed and signed into law in late June of 2019.118 The bill aimed
to define the “[c]ompletion of all terms of sentence” as put forth in Amendment
Four’s text.119 In doing so, the legislature instituted a requirement of “[f]ull
payment of fines or fees ordered by the court as a part of the sentence” to become
eligible for restoration.120 This included restitution (including payments to
persons, estates, entities, the state, or the federal government); fees associated
with court proceedings (such as investigative and criminal defense costs); and
those related to post-incarceration supervision (like parole or probation).121
Repayment of financial obligations would not be considered satisfied by a
“conversion to a civil lien”; thus, even those financial obligations converted to
civil judgments have to be repaid before restoration.122 Although SB 7066
permits the sentencing court to modify any LFOs, the law does not address the
large number of Floridians who face a barrier to restoration due to indigency.123
Having entered into force months after Amendment Four had passed, SB
7066 resulted in a flood of confusion across the state. First, between Amendment
Four’s passing in November and SB 7066’s enactment in June, thousands of
former felons registered to vote.124 After its enactment, all who had previously
registered were left in political limbo, unsure if the vote they cast in previous
elections counted or if they would face legal recourse for attempting to cast a
ballot in the future.125 Further complicating the restoration process was the
state’s inability to determine the amounts owed.126 Despite instituting the
requirement of payment, the state had not taken action to create or compile any
comprehensive database of repayment amounts.127 Various agencies—at both
the state and local level—are involved in the recording of fees, including
prosecutors, court clerks, and collection agencies.128 Each agency utilizes
different computer systems or paper files for older cases.129 As a result, many
118

Id.
FLA. STAT. § 98.0751(2)(a) (2020).
120
Id. at (2)(a)(5).
121
Id. at (2)(a).
122
Id. at (2)(a)(5)(e)(III).
123
See FLA. STAT. § 98.0751; see also Raysor Complaint, supra note 1, at 15 (noting SB 7066 does not
require modifications to LFOs based on indigency).
124
Morris, supra note 116, at 1.
125
See, e.g., Jones Consolidated Brief, supra note 10, at 13. For example, Curtis Bryant owes
approximately $10,000 in LFOs, for which he makes a monthly payment of $30 to a debt collector. He was
otherwise eligible to vote in two elections after Amendment Four’s passing (a city election in November 2019
and a runoff in December 2019). However, he stated he did not cast a ballot due to fear of prosecution. Id.
126
See Gardner & Rozsa, supra note 28.
127
Id.
128
See id.
129
See id.
119
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individuals are left either running “from office to office,” as one former felon
put it, or stagnated by fear of criminal prosecution for improper registration.130
Currently, even amidst litigation, the state has not implemented any system
for local officials or formerly incarcerated individuals to confirm the actual
amount owed.131 The Chief Operating Officer for the Hillsborough County
Clerk, Doug Bakke, stated “that he and four employees spent [twelve] to
[fifteen] hours” trying to determine what one individual owed, and even then,
they were unable to confirm with certainty the exact amount.132 The Director of
the Florida Division of Elections, Maria Matthews, stated that due to these
complications, her office could only process fifty-seven applications from
former felons per day.133 At that rate, the Division of Elections would not even
begin to make a dent in processing the registrations of the 1.4 million Floridians
with felony convictions eligible for re-enfranchisement.134
This lack of standardization has led many to face different fates, as county
officials have employed their own methods of enforcing SB 7066’s pay-to-vote
scheme.135 The state has not provided any clarification for these local entities
nor have they made the process any easier. Secretary of State Laurel Lee has
affirmed that it is the individual’s responsibility to determine if they are eligible
to register, and has further stated if they cannot determine this, they should not
register.136 However, based on the inability of the state to establish a system to
verify eligibility to vote or to determine existing LFOs, registering to vote—
even for those who may be able to pay off their debts—is insidiously
impracticable.
For Ms. Raysor, who was mentioned above, these bureaucratic deficiencies
have disastrously complicated any attempt to cast a ballot. Ms. Raysor currently
owes $3,930 in outstanding fees and costs related to prior convictions.137
However, Ms. Raysor’s costs arise from both her prior felony conviction as well
as two misdemeanor convictions.138 She has no method for determining which
130
Id. (“His enthusiasm [to vote] faded when he realized he could risk a new arrest if he inaccurately
swore that he had no court debts. ‘I kind of quit. I don’t want to go to jail for that.’”).
131
Id. (“But 11 months after Gov. Ron DeSantis . . . signed the legislation, and with the fall presidential
election inching ever closer, that system still doesn’t exist.”).
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
See Morris, supra note 116, at 1.
135
See Plaintiffs’ Opening Statement, Jones v. Desantis, 2020 WL 5493770 (2020) (No. 4:19-cv-300RH/MJF) (on file with Brennan Center for Justice).
136
Jones Consolidated Brief, supra note 10, at 99.
137
Id. at 16.
138
Id.
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of these costs are connected solely to her felony conviction.139 Thus, costs
associated with a misdemeanor conviction may prevent her from exercising her
right to vote due to Florida’s failure to appropriately administer its own pay-tovote system.
D. Jones v. DeSantis and Its Appellate History
In light of SB 7066’s problematic enactment, Bonnie Raysor, along with
others similarly situated, brought a lawsuit in federal court against the Governor,
Secretary of State, and the Supervisors of Elections in the plaintiffs’ respective
counties.140 The suit challenged the LFO provision of SB 7066, alleging it
violated both the U.S. Constitution and the National Voter Registration Act.141
In the District Court for the Northern District of Florida, plaintiffs sought a
preliminary injunction to achieve certainty prior to the 2020 Presidential election
cycle.142 At this proceeding, the court acknowledged that the state had the power
to deny restoration to certain formerly convicted felons but reaffirmed that these
disenfranchisement schemes were still subject to constitutional review.143 The
district court ultimately concluded that Florida could not “deny an individual
plaintiff the right to vote just because the plaintiff lacks the financial resources
to pay whatever financial obligations Amendment 4 and SB 7066 require.”144
Thus, the court granted the injunction in part, forbidding the state from
preventing any of the seventeen plaintiffs who established a genuine inability to
pay from casting a ballot.145
In February of 2020, the question came before the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit for the first time on a motion to stay the district court’s
preliminary injunction pending appeal.146 This time, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the lower court’s injunction, agreeing that “[d]enying access to the

139

Id.
See Jones v. Governor of Fla., 950 F.3d 795, 799 (11th Cir. 2020). Along with the individually named
plaintiffs, the case includes several organizational plaintiffs, such as the Florida State Conference of the NAACP,
the Orange County Branch of the NAACP, and the League of Women Voters of Florida. Id.
141
Jones Consolidated Brief, supra note 10, at 7. The plaintiffs’ constitutional argument was that SB 7066
violated both the Fourteenth Amendment (as an unconstitutional wealth-based discrimination) and the TwentyFourth Amendment (as a poll tax). See id. at 145, 153.
142
Jones v. Desantis, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1290 (N.D. Fla. 2019).
143
Id. at 1299.
144
Id. at 1309. The district court added that “[a]ccess to the franchise cannot be made to depend on an
individual’s financial resources.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214,
1216–17 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005)).
145
Id. at 1310.
146
Jones v. Governor of Fla., 950 F.3d 795, 800 (11th Cir. 2020).
140
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franchise to those genuinely unable to pay solely on account of wealth does not
survive heightened scrutiny.”147 Thus, the state was still “enjoin[ed] . . . from
preventing the plaintiffs from voting based on their genuine inability to pay legal
financial obligations.”148 On May 24, 2020, when the case came back to the
district court, the court allowed former felons who demonstrated an inability to
pay the right to register and vote.149 Over a month following the district court
decision, the Eleventh Circuit stayed the permanent injunction pending appeal—
just “[nineteen] days before the voter registration deadline.”150 This stay came
before the Supreme Court on an application to vacate.151 However, the Supreme
Court denied that application, prompting a dissent from Justice Sotomayor,
joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Kagan.152
The state then appealed the permanent injunction, generating the latest
iteration in the case’s history thus far—the decision from the Eleventh Circuit
delivered on September 11, 2020.153 In this ruling, the Eleventh Circuit
overturned its past decision on both the preliminary and permanent injunctions,
upholding SB 7066 as consistent with the Equal Protection clause.154 Deciding
the district court had wrongfully applied heightened scrutiny, the majority
evaluated the law under rational basis review.155 It determined the right to vote
was not fundamental as applied to felons.156 Therefore, to warrant heightened
scrutiny, SB 7066 would have to invoke a suspect classification.157 However,
the court held SB 7066 did not employ a suspect class, as “[t]he only
classification at issue is between felons who have completed all terms of their
sentences, including financial terms, and those who have not.”158 In the Eleventh
Circuit’s view, Florida “withholds the franchise from any felon, regardless of
wealth, who has failed to complete any term of his criminal sentence—financial
or otherwise.”159 On wealth as a suspect classification, it determined Florida’s

147

Id. at 807.
Id. at 832–33.
149
Jones v. Desantis, 462 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1203 (N.D. Fla. 2020).
150
Raysor v. Desantis, 140 S. Ct. 2600, 2602 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
151
Id. at 2600.
152
Id.
153
Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016, 1028 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
154
Id. at 1025.
155
Id. at 1030.
156
Id. at 1029 (“Whatever may be true of the right to vote generally, felons ‘cannot complain about the
loss of a fundamental right to vote because felon disenfranchisement is explicitly permitted under the terms of
Richardson.’” (quoting Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010))).
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 1030.
148
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pay-to-vote scheme did not invoke any of the “narrow circumstances” permitting
laws “burden[ing] the indigent” to be reviewed under heightened scrutiny.160
After determining the law was subject to rational basis review, the Eleventh
Circuit upheld it as rationally related to a legitimate government interest.161 First,
the legitimate government interests noted were the state’s interest “in
disenfranchising convicted felons” and restoring rights to those who had
completed their term as a form of rehabilitation.162 Conversely, one dissent
viewed Florida’s interests as more focused on debt collection and punishment.163
Second, the means chosen—conditioning re-enfranchisement on payment—
were determined to be related to these interests as “[t]he people of Florida could
rationally conclude that felons who have completed all terms of their sentences,
including [payment] . . . are more likely to responsibly exercise” the right to
vote.164 Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit claimed it did not matter that the
classification is “based on rational speculation unsupported by the evidence”165
or that the law “appears to discriminate irrationally.”166
As discussed in the next part, this opinion failed to correctly categorize the
suspect class relevant in this case. Even if the court’s classification was correct,
the law would fall into the narrow circumstances burdening indigent defendants,
requiring heightened scrutiny. The apparent mistakes of the Jones decision
illuminate the need for a new precedent to eradicate poverty-based punishments,
especially those which burden a fundamental right.
IV. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT GOT IT WRONG IN JONES
The Eleventh Circuit’s en banc decision, authored by Judge William Pryor,
upheld the Florida law in a divided vote.167 This Part argues the majority erred
both by (A) employing the wrong classification when deciding the proper level
of scrutiny, and (B) ignoring the rife Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding
both indigent defendants and the fundamental nature of the right to vote
irrespective of one’s prior convictions. Lastly, this Part concludes by arguing
why such corrections by the Jones court would not have been enough to truly

160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167

Id.
See id. at 1034.
Id.
Id. at 1085–86 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1035 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1036 (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993)).
Id. (quoting In re Wood, 866 F.2d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1989)).
See id.
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prevent payment-based restoration schemes from infecting the democratic
process.
A. The Eleventh Circuit Employed the Wrong Classifications Invoked by SB
7066
First, the Eleventh Circuit employed the wrong classification to determine
the proper level of scrutiny. Under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection guarantee, “classifications that neither implicate fundamental rights
nor proceed along suspect lines are subject to rational basis review.”168 To
prompt heightened scrutiny, there are two potential avenues: (1) invoking a
fundamental right or (2) identifying a suspect class.169 The Jones majority
wrongfully stifled the plaintiffs’ arguments for pursuing both avenues by
erroneously claiming “[s]tates may restrict voting by felons in ways that would
be impermissible for other citizens.”170 Although states may “make
classifications in law when such classifications are rooted in reason,” they
cannot employ “differentiations . . . that have no relation to a rational policy . . .
or authorize[] the imposition of conditions that offend the deepest
presuppositions of our society.”171 Simply, states “can no more discriminate on
account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color.”172 There is no
asterisk in the Fourteenth Amendment permitting discrimination—based on
poverty or race—as long as an individual has a felony conviction.
The majority acknowledged the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition but
still concluded that “laws that govern felon disenfranchisement . . . are subject
to rational basis review.”173 It offered the classification at hand was not one
invoking an ability to pay, but rather, “[was] between felons who have
completed all terms of their sentences, including financial terms, and those who
have not.”174 This classification ultimately ignores SB 7066’s clear implication
of exacting a payment as conditional for regaining the right to vote. Under
constitutional review, statutes need not only be considered facially, but can also

168

Id. at 1029.
See id.
170
Id.
171
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 21–22 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
172
Id. at 17 (plurality opinion).
173
Jones, 975 F.3d at 1030 (“Although States enjoy significant discretion in distributing the franchise to
felons, it is not unfettered. A State may not rely on suspect classifications in this area any more than in other
areas of legislation.”).
174
Id. at 1029.
169
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be considered for their effects.175 In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified this
point previously:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance,
yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil
eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to
their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of
the Constitution.176

SB 7066 cannot be evaluated solely based upon its facial language and must be
judged by its unequal hand. Accordingly, the majority cannot determine the
classification invoked by the law solely based on its textual propositions. It must
acknowledge the classification the law implicates through its operation and
subsequent burdens. On its face, SB 7066 does state that all felons must
complete terms of sentences, including payment to obtain re-enfranchisement.177
However, SB 7066 effectively prevents restoration for only those who are
genuinely unable to pay. The Supreme Court has recognized a similar premise,
noting those sanctions that are “wholly contingent on one’s ability to pay, and
thus ‘visit different consequences on two categories of persons’ . . . [and] apply
to all indigents and do not reach anyone outside that class.”178 Judge Adalberto
Jordan’s dissent in Jones argued for a similar premise, realizing “heightened
scrutiny applies here because the LFO requirement results in an absolute
deprivation of the right to vote for felons in any elections that take place while
they are indigent.”179
Accordingly, to adhere to Supreme Court precedent, the Eleventh Circuit
majority in Jones should have recognized the distinction inherent in SB 7066’s
operation between those with a genuine inability to pay and those able to pay.
Government agencies routinely delineate such categorizations when
determining indigency both within the criminal justice system, when appointing
a public defender180 or waiving fees for transcript copies,181 as well as outside
175

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886).
Id.
177
FLA. STAT. § 98.0751 (2020).
178
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127 (1996)
179
Jones, 975 F.3d at 1075 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
180
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
181
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating Illinois could not “shut
off means of appellate review for indigent defendants”). For example, Florida permits an individual to file an
application for determination of civil indigent status. See FLA. STAT. § 57.081 (2020). If the application is
accepted, the applicant can receive services such as “filing fees; service of process; certified copies of orders or
final judgments; a single photocopy of any court pleading, record, or instrument” despite a present inability to
pay. Id. To determine indigency, Florida considers one’s net income, as well as other income such as social
176
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of the criminal justice system, when considering filing fees for political
candidacy.182 However, such a mechanism to determine indigency has not been
incorporated in SB 7066’s requirement for full payment of LFOs. The current
system not only permits voter eligibility to be determined based upon affluence,
but also allows access to the franchise to be dependent upon the ability to pay.183
The majority opinion in Jones continued, noting SB 7066’s “requirement that
felons complete their sentences applies regardless of race, religion, or national
origin,” and accordingly does not affect a suspect class.184 Although poverty
alone has not been regarded as “suspect,” the Supreme Court has made it quite
clear—states cannot draw lines on the basis of one’s wealth in terms of access
to proceedings for indigent defendants185 nor in determining access to the
franchise.186
B. The Eleventh Circuit Erroneously Applied Precedent
Even assuming the Eleventh Circuit utilized the proper classification, the
Florida scheme would still call for a heightened level of scrutiny under current
precedent. The statute would easily fall within two exceptions to rational basis
review provided in M.L.B. v. S.L.J. that apply when evaluating laws that burden
indigent defendants—a notion the majority in Jones rejected outright.187 M.L.B.
concerned a challenge to a Mississippi law that required payment of record
preparation fees when appealing one’s termination of parental rights.188
Recognizing the quasi-judicial nature of parental rights proceedings and the
fundamental nature of one’s parental rights, the Court carved out two exceptions
security benefits, assets, liabilities, and debts. See FLA. STAT. § 57.085 (2020).
182
Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718 (1974) (“[W]e note that there are obvious and well known means
of testing the ‘seriousness’ of a candidacy . . . [apart from] the neutral . . . payment of a filing fee.”).
183
FLA. STAT. § 98.0751(2)(a)(5) (2020).
184
Jones, 975 F.3d at 1030.
185
See infra Part V.A; see also Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19 (plurality opinion) (“There can be no equal justice
where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.”); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353, 357–58 (1963) (“There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment” when “the rich
man can require the court to listen to argument of counsel before deciding on the merits, but a poor man
cannot.”); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127 (1996) (“Sanctions . . . like the Mississippi prescription here at
issue are not merely disproportionate in impact. Rather, they are wholly contingent on one’s ability to pay, and
thus ‘visit different consequences on two categories of persons.” (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235,
242 (1970))).
186
See infra Part IV.B; see also Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (“[A] State
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter
or payment of any fee an electoral standard.”); Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1216 n.1 (11th Cir.
2005) (“Access to the franchise cannot be made to depend on an individual’s financial resources.”).
187
Jones, 975 F.3d at 1032 (en banc) (“[M.L.B.] represent[s] limited exceptions to the general rule that
rational basis review applies to claims of wealth discrimination. They do not apply here.” (citation omitted)).
188
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 106.
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for wealth-based discrimination to prompt heightened scrutiny:189 (1) “[t]he
basic right to participate in political processes as voters and candidates” and (2)
“access to judicial processes in cases criminal or ‘quasi-criminal in nature.’”190
In both of these circumstances, there is one clear prohibition—access may not
turn on the ability to pay.191
Contrary to the holding in Jones v. Governor of Florida, Florida’s rights
restoration scheme and those which similarly require full payment of LFOs
before achieving re-enfranchisement fall within the exceptions the Supreme
Court established in M.L.B—a conclusion that did not evade Judge Beverly
Martin in her dissent.192 Pay-to-vote rights’ restoration statutes violate both of
M.L.B.’s prohibitions on laws that condition payment on (1) the basic right to
participate in political processes as voters and (2) judicial processes which are
criminal or quasi-criminal.193
First, conditioning access to the franchise for indigent former felons on
payment of all LFOs is squarely the case M.L.B. sought to address.194 One of the
cases that M.LB. referred to as a reflection of this principle is Lubin v. Panish,
decided in 1977.195 Lubin involved a California law that necessitated payment
of a ballot-access fee, with no alternatives to get one’s name on the ballot.196
Facing a challenge by an indigent person who was unable to pay this filing fee,
the Supreme Court struck down the law as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause, affirming that “a [s]tate may not, consistent with constitutional
standards, require from an indigent candidate filing fees he cannot pay.”197
Although Lubin affected the candidate-side of the ballot, M.L.B. clarified this
prohibition applies to candidates and voters alike.198 Similar to Lubin, the state
cannot require an indigent former felon to pay fees he cannot afford to achieve
access to the political process with no adequate alternative paths to meaningfully
participate.199
189

Id. at 124.
Id. (citation omitted).
191
Id.
192
Jones, 975 F.3d at 1076 (Martin, J., dissenting). This dissent was joined by Judges Charles Wilson,
Adalberto Jordan, and Jill Pryor.
193
See M.LB., 519 U.S. at 124.
194
Id. (“This basic right to participate in the political processes as voters . . . cannot be limited to those
who can pay . . . .”).
195
Id. at 124 n.14.
196
Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 710 (1974).
197
Id. at 718.
198
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 124.
199
Id. at 124 n.14 (“[V]oting cannot hinge on ability to pay . . . , for it is a ‘fundamental political right . .
. preservative of all rights.’” (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886))).
190
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Second, Florida’s process for restoration can also fall within the second
exception prescribed by M.L.B.—access to proceedings “criminal or ‘quasi
criminal in nature.’”200 In such cases, “state[s] may not ‘bolt the door to equal
justice’” as “[s]anctions . . . wholly contingent on one’s ability to pay” are
impermissible.201 As discussed fully in Part IV.A, the State of Florida has
conceded the full payment of LFOs and its subsequent bar to restoration are
levied for the purposes of punishment to ensure a defendant fully pays their debt
to society before obtaining reintegration.202
Irrespective of whether the Eleventh Circuit employed the proper level of
scrutiny or whether one of the two M.L.B. exceptions can be applied to SB 7066,
the same conclusion remains: the law should be held to heightened scrutiny
either through current precedent or a new era of jurisprudence. If so, Florida’s
scheme and those similarly enacted would fail as “[t]he [s]tate’s pocketbook
interest in advance payment . . . [is] unimpressive when measured against the
stakes” for these indigent former felons.203 Felony disenfranchisement’s “long
history, . . . predat[ing] the founding of the Republic”204 should not insulate it
from constitutional review, especially when it has mutated into another tool to
criminalize those in poverty.205 Accordingly, as explained in Part V, the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Jones emphasizes the need for a new era of
wealth-based disenfranchisement jurisprudence.
C. Current Precedent Is Not Enough
Even if the Eleventh Circuit had correctly employed its past precedent,
current jurisprudence is not sufficient to address pay-to-vote systems operating
within Florida and throughout the country.206 Conditioning rights restoration
upon payment is merely one symptom of a much larger disease in which state
legislatures attempt to enact indefinite deprivations as a form of punishment.207
200

Id. at 124 (quoting Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196 (1971)).
Id. at 124, 127 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 24 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
202
See supra Part IV.A.
203
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 121.
204
Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016, 1028 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Felony disenfranchisement’s
longstanding history is succinctly one of the main reasons why such mechanisms should not stand. See generally
Figler, supra note 73, at 724 (describing the use of disenfranchisement laws in the Jim Crow Era and the racial
motivations driving felony disenfranchisement).
205
Jones, 975 F.3d at 1028.
206
See supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing state systems that sanction indefinite
disenfranchisement due to non-payment of LFOs).
207
See Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-29-202 (2020)
(preventing rights restoration due to nonpayment of child support, which is a legal financial obligation outside
of one’s term of sentence).
201
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As discussed next, the Supreme Court precedent established in Richardson v.
Ramirez has allowed state legislatures to avoid constitutional challenges by
embedding their restoration schemes within disenfranchisement to fall squarely
within Richardson’s protection.208 However, systems such as Florida’s are not
solely about removing one’s voting rights upon felony conviction, but also about
indefinitely shutting individuals out from the democratic process. Based upon
the insistence of state legislatures to circumvent the current legal framework by
re-framing, a new precedent is required if the unconstitutional nature of these
laws is to be addressed.
The Eleventh Circuit in Jones insisted that any challenge to Florida’s felony
disenfranchisement law would be doomed under the Supreme Court precedent
established in Richardson v. Ramirez.209 In Richardson, the Supreme Court
reviewed a California law that authorized disenfranchisement for those
convicted of a felony based upon an Equal Protection claim.210 In its opinion,
the Supreme Court referenced the less-cited Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which includes the following:
But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors . .
. is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twentyone years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way
abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime.211

The Supreme Court interpreted this to provide an exception for felony
disenfranchisement laws from the Fourteenth Amendment’s progeny,
explaining the section’s legislative history clarifies the intention of lawmakers
to exempt disenfranchisement on the basis of a felony conviction.212 Ultimately,
Richardson allowed felony disenfranchisement laws to be distinguished from
the standard equal protection analysis involving a fundamental right, permitting
208

Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974)
See Jones, 975 F.3d at 1030. The court added that “[w]hatever may be true of the right to vote generally,
felons ‘cannot complain about their loss of a fundamental right to vote because felon disenfranchisement is
explicitly permitted under the terms of Richardson.’” Id. at 1029 (quoting Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067,
1079 (9th Cir. 2010)).
210
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 27–28 (“[N]o person convicted of any infamous crime, no person hereafter
convicted of the embezzlement or misappropriate of public money . . . shall ever exercise the privileges of an
elector in this State.”). The California Elections Code went on to posit in Sections 310 and 321 that “an affidavit
of registration shall show whether the affiant has been convicted of ‘a felony which disqualifies [him] from
voting.’” Id. at 28.
211
Id. at 42 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV).
212
See id. at 43 (“[W]hat legislative history there is indicates that this language was intended by Congress
to mean what it says.”). The Court notes there were no changes made on the House floor to edit the language of
the section and highlights several quotations from the floor in which lawmakers speak to this crime-based
exception. Id. at 43–48.
209
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a rational basis review despite burdens upon the right to vote.213 The Court’s
holding in Richardson was solely that felony disenfranchisement falls under the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, prompting rational basis of
disenfranchisement laws.214 Although the Fourteenth Amendment’s language
does not particularly preclude restoration schemes based upon discriminatory
lines which would normally provoke heightened scrutiny,215 many circuits have
failed to ascertain such a distinction.216
Even if the courts struck down such laws under current precedent, state
legislatures will phrase their laws upon disenfranchisement to remain within the
wide berth of Richardson’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus,
a new jurisprudence squarely aimed at review of restoration frameworks—
particularly those which allow those with means to get their voting rights back
while leaving those without excluded from the ballot box every election—must
be established by the Supreme Court to form a cohesive body of precedent for
the circuits to apply.
V. A NEW APPROACH TO REVIEWING PAY-TO-VOTE RESTORATION LAWS
The same criminal justice system that provides counsel for indigent
defendants allows fees for these services levied on the back-end to relegate these
individuals to a second-class citizenship, devoid of the most sacred of our
rights—the right to vote.217 Due to the intent to criminalize poverty, pay-to-vote
felony restoration laws should be evaluated by the Supreme Court’s rife
jurisprudence concerning wealth-based discrimination both within the criminal
justice system and within access to the franchise. This Part argues that, to
213

See id.
See id. at 54 (exempting felony disenfranchisement from previous “state-imposed restrictions on the
franchise” where the court applied heightened scrutiny).
215
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (“The law .
. . administered by public authority with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as to practically make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is .
. . within the prohibition of the Constitution.”).
216
See Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding former felons had no
“fundamental interest to assert” a challenge to Tennessee’s restoration system because the law stripping away
their voting rights was constitutional under Richardson); see also Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016,
1029 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (upholding the Florida restoration law based upon the notion that Richardson
expressly permitted felony disenfranchisement); Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1114 (5th Cir. 1978)
(upholding a Texas law that distinguished between federal and state convictions for enfranchisement based upon
Richardson’s holding that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment is an “express approval” of the state’s power
to both disenfranchise and re-enfranchise former felons).
217
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964) (“Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a
fundamental matter in a free and democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free
and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights . . . .”).
214
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eradicate laws that aim to punish on account of one’s poverty, a new
constitutional jurisprudence prompting heightened scrutiny is required.
Section A discusses the Supreme Court’s wealth discrimination
jurisprudence within the criminal justice system, arguing that payment-based
restoration often operates to levy indefinite financial burdens as a form of
punishment and prohibits reintegration for many years after terms of
incarceration. Next, section B examines a similar line of cases within the
political process in which the Court has rejected wealth-based burdens upon
access to the franchise. Relying upon both these lines of case law, section C calls
for a new standard, uniting this precedent to propose a new framework to review
efforts to criminalize one’s poverty apart from mere confinement to ensure all
have access to every privilege of their citizenship, regardless of financial status.
A. Wealth Discrimination in the Criminal Justice System
Through conditioning restoration on payment, the state exacts a near
indefinite punishment based upon ability to pay. Thus, these laws implicate the
Supreme Court’s line of cases regarding wealth distinctions in the criminal
justice system.
Foundational to wealth discrimination jurisprudence is the Supreme Court’s
decision in Griffin v. Illinois.218 Decided in 1956, Griffin involved a challenge
to an Illinois law that required defendants to “furnish the appellate court with a
bill of exceptions or report of proceedings at the trial” to file an appeal of their
conviction for writs of error.219 Both requirements were nearly impossible to
supply without paying the cost of “a stenographic transcript of the . . .
proceedings.”220 In homicide cases, these costs were waived; however, in all
other criminal cases, defendants were required to purchase it—erecting a barrier
between indigent defendants and the right to an appeal.221
Faced with a question of constitutionality, the Supreme Court held that the
Illinois law established a system in which some were too poor to appeal,
violating the Equal Protection Clause by allowing “the kind of a trial a man gets”
to depend “on the amount of money he has.”222 Although the state was not
required to offer this right to an appeal, once established, it could not offer it “in

218
219
220
221
222

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 13.
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 19.
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a way that discriminate[d] against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty.”223 The Court prescribed that distinctions made along poverty lines are
akin to those distinctions made “on account of religion, race, or color” as “the
ability to pay costs . . . [bore] no rational relationship” to the deprivation of
rights.224 Thus, the Court established the standard that all “ought to obtain right
and justice freely, and without being obligated to purchase it, completely.”225
The right to an appeal is not the only context in which the Court has decided
states cannot “draw a line . . . preclud[ing] convicted indigent persons . . . from
securing such a review.”226 Relying upon its progeny in Griffin, the Court
similarly refused to uphold another Illinois law that drew a distinction based on
wealth in Williams v. Illinois.227 Considering “whether an indigent may be
continued in confinement beyond the maximum term specified . . . because of
his failure to satisfy the monetary provisions of the sentence,” the Court held
that imprisonment resulting “directly from an involuntary nonpayment of a fine
or court costs [is] . . . an impermissible discrimination that rests on ability to
pay.”228 Accordingly, Williams expanded the notion that began in Griffin to then
prohibit the State from subjecting defendants to further punishment “solely
because they are too poor to pay the fine”—a key prohibition when preventing
restoration based upon inability to pay.229
Lastly, Bearden v. Georgia provides the final nail in the coffin, as the
Supreme Court again rejected wealth-based distinctions in relation to criminal
defendants. In Bearden, the Court considered “whether a sentencing court
[could] revoke a defendant’s probation for failure to pay the imposed fine and
restitution.”230 The Court held that a revocation based upon a genuine inability
to pay was unconstitutional as contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment’s
guarantee of fundamental fairness.231 The majority rejected the state’s
223

Id. at 18.
Id. at 17–18.
225
Id. at 18. (quoting ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, § 12).
226
Id. at 23 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
227
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241 (1970) (“Applying the teaching of the Griffin case here, we
conclude that an indigent criminal defendant may not be imprisoned in default of payment of a fine . . . .”).
228
Id. at 236, 240–41. Here, the State’s interest in collecting payment for both fines and court costs was
not significant enough to permit the distinction. See id. at 240–41.
229
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 664 (1983) (discussing the precedent established in Williams). This
prohibition of extending confinement based on inability to pay was further expanded in Tate v. Short, where the
Court held the State could not convert fines into jail time based on an inability to pay. See 401 U.S. 395, 398
(1971) (adopting the view of four members of the Court in Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 509 (1970)).
230
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 665.
231
Id. at 672–73. Justice O’Connor’s opinion stressed this must be a genuine inability to pay, meaning the
probationer “made all reasonable efforts to pay the fine or restitution, and yet cannot do so through no fault of
224
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arguments regarding their interest in ensuring restitution be paid to victims and
their interest in protecting society by removing the defendant to ensure he will
not continue to commit crimes.232 Crucial to this rejection was the
acknowledgment that “poverty by itself” will not “indicat[e] [the defendant] may
commit crimes in the future.”233 Permitting revocation of probation for failure
to a pay would “be little more than punishing a person for his poverty.”234 The
combination of Supreme Court jurisprudence within this area, therefore,
provides one conclusion—an individual cannot be indefinitely punished due to
their poverty.
Regardless of the form of punishment, Griffin has established that “the
ability to pay costs . . . bears no rational relationship” to the deprivation of a
fundamental right.235 When the right invoked is one of freedom to participate
fully in the political process, a former felon’s financial status will not
demonstrate “danger[],” a “need[] . . . to be incapacitated,” or a need to exclude
from the voting booth.236 Every election that passes can be seen as an extension
of a sentence akin to Williams, as every election that passes exacts another
irreparable harm.
Based upon this, Florida’s felony restoration scheme and those comparably
requiring full payment before enfranchisement should be regarded as akin to the
punishments unduly enacted in Griffin, Williams, and Bearden. Florida
conceded in Jones that it views SB 7066’s disenfranchisement as a form of
punishment.237 Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment’s rarely cited Section 2
refers to disenfranchisement as a punishment for a felony.238 Thus,
disenfranchisement exacted upon a former defendant regardless of a genuine
inability of pay is the primary action the Court has sought to prohibit—indefinite
punishment levied solely because an individual is too poor to pay the price.
Accordingly, “Griffin’s principle has not been confined to cases in which
imprisonment is at stake.”239 Accordingly, imprisonment cannot be seen as the
sole case in which we reject these wealth-based distinctions, exemplifying the

his own.” Id. at 668.
232
Id. at 671.
233
Id.
234
Id.
235
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956) (plurality opinion).
236
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 671.
237
See State Defendants Brief on Appeal, supra note 32, at 25 (arguing that Bearden acknowledges the
State’s interest in punishing persons both rich and poor).
238
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
239
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 111 (1996).
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need for a new form of heightened scrutiny to account for such non-carceral
punishments.
Despite the precedent established by these cases, poverty is still the defining
factor when it comes to access to the franchise for former felons as paymentbased punishments loom following a conviction. In 1962, the Supreme Court in
Gideon v. Wainwright proscribed “any person haled into court, who is too poor
to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him.”240 Gideon’s promise was hailed as monumental in ushering in a new era
of jurisprudence to aid the disadvantaged.241 However, this new era cannot be
achieved if the costs are levied on the latter end, allowing for fines and fees
associated with the defendant’s guarantee of a fair trial to be prohibitory as those
formerly convicted attempt to move past their prior sentences.
For example, Bonnie Raysor’s previously mentioned legal financial
obligations—which she will not be able to pay off until 2031—result from “court
costs, [the] cost of prosecution, . . . [the] cost of investigation, [a] public defender
application fee, and [a] public defender fee.”242 On average in Florida, these
court related costs amount to $475, including $50 for an application for a public
defender, “$100 for actual representation by [that] public defender,” $100
minimum for the state’s attorney, and “$225 as ‘additional court costs.’”243 Ms.
Raysor is not alone. Judge Jordan’s dissent further noted that at the trial level of
Jones, the district court found “[seventy percent] of those felons who had
completed their sentences (except for the payment of LFOs) were represented
by a public defender,” indicating their indigency.244 If the criminal justice
system is ever to fully eradicate the criminalization of poverty rife within its
ranks and truly fulfill Gideon’s promise, it must first seek to prohibit paymentbased punishment within rights restoration.
B. Wealth Discrimination in Access to the Franchise
The right to vote has consistently been reaffirmed as fundamental to the
functioning of a healthy democracy.245 As early as 1886, the Supreme Court
240

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
Abe Krash, Right to a Lawyer: The Implication of Gideon v. Wainwright, 39 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
150, 159–60 (1964). Author Abe Krash assisted Abe Fortas, who was appointed by the Supreme Court to
represent Mr. Gideon, the landmark decision’s namesake, in preparation of the brief for the case. Id. at 150
(about the author).
242
See Raysor Complaint, supra note 1, at 7.
243
Jones v. DeSantis, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1297 (N.D. Fla. 2019).
244
Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016, 1067 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (Jordan, J., dissenting).
245
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964).
241
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proudly asserted this notion, stating the right to vote “is regarded as a
fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights.”246 Since
“the right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or
conditioned,” any infringements are generally disfavored.247 Such disfavor
extends to several forms of discrimination even if the lines are drawn amongst
race or wealth classifications.248
Despite this, the majority in Jones v. Governor of Florida contended the
jurisprudence regarding the right to vote as fundamental was inapplicable to SB
7066 and its operation, posing that Richardson provided felons were not entitled
such access to this fundamental right.249 However, as discussed prior,
Richardson merely upheld a California law disenfranchising felons, offering that
the Fourteenth Amendment condoned such disenfranchisement laws.250 It did
not explicitly strip away the fundamental nature of the restoration of those voting
rights for so many Americans nor did it permit discrimination within
restoration.251 Accordingly, pay-to-vote restoration laws like Florida’s should
not only be viewed in light of the Court’s prohibition on wealth-based
discrimination in the criminal justice sphere, but also in light of the longstanding
prohibition on affluence-related prerequisites to vote as embodied by the Court
in Harper v. Virginia Board of Education.252
Harper involved a Virginia law that required all residents to pay a $1.50 tax
six months prior to any election as a precondition for casting their ballot.253 To
register, a person had to pay the tax for three years before filing an application
of voter registration.254 The Supreme Court struck down the law, acknowledging
the vein of jurisprudence flowing from Griffin, and held that the “requirement
of fee paying causes an ‘invidious’ discrimination that runs afoul of the Equal
Protection Clause.”255 Although endowed with the ability to affix reasonable
voter qualifications, any requirements related to the affluence of the voter cannot
246

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
Harper v. Va. Bd. of Educ., 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
248
Id. at 668 (“Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property like those of race, are traditionally
disfavored.”).
249
Jones, 975 F.3d at 1029.
250
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974).
251
Id. at 56; see also Jones, 975 F.3d at 1059 (Martin, J., dissenting) (noting the Supreme Court in
Richardson “held that the Fourteenth Amendment condone[d] felony disenfranchisement” but did not “tell [the
Court] what to do once the State Legislature . . . adopts a scheme to restore the fundamental right to vote” to
former felons).
252
Harper v. Va. Bd. of Educ., 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
253
Id. at 664 n.1.
254
Id.
255
Id. at 668 (citation omitted) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541(1942)).
247
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be considered as such.256 Despite pay-to-vote laws being “an old familiar form
of taxation,” such payment-based prerequisites were indefinitely prohibited.257
Ultimately, Florida’s restoration scheme is the exact thing Harper
prohibits—“wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter’s
qualifications.”258 By explicitly disavowing registration until full payment is
received, SB 7066 is no different than the Virginia law in Harper requiring a tax
three years prior to registration. Although SB 7066’s required payment of LFOs
is levied upon felons as distinct from all voters, it still places wealth at the center
of its operation. Harper explicitly pronounced that wealth or payment of a fee
does not indicate a “responsibl[e] exercise [of] the franchise” nor are those with
the ability to pay more “deserving,”259 realizing that “[w]ealth . . . is not germane
to one’s ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process.”260
The Eleventh Circuit applied this provision to a previous iteration of
Florida’s felony disenfranchisement in Johnson v. Governor of Florida, citing
to Harper when writing that “[a]ccess to the franchise cannot be made to depend
on an individual’s financial resources.”261 The Court noted that it need not
address that aspect of the petitioner’s claim as Florida’s system at the time “[did]
not deny access to the restoration of the franchise based on ability to pay.”262
Since Johnson, the Florida legislature has expressly conditioned restoration on
one’s ability to pay LFOs.263 As a result, the law must now serve as an example
of how the state should be constitutionally prohibited from designing rights
restoration laws precisely upon wealth-based distinctions due to the convergence
of criminal punishment and access to one’s fundamental rights.
C. Uniting for a New Standard for Review
As noted earlier, laws employing poverty-based distinctions are not new
phenomena.264 Rather, the criminal justice system has been constructed upon
256
Id. (“Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one’s ability to participate intelligently in the
electoral process.”).
257
Id. at 669.
258
Id. at 668.
259
Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016, 1035 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
260
Harper, 383 U.S. at 668.
261
Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1216 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005). Here, the court declined to
expressly rule upon “whether conditioning an application for [enfranchisement] on paying restitution would be”
an “invidious discrimination,” as Florida’s previous system did not condition rights restoration on payment. Id.
at 1217 n.1, 1238 n.7.
262
Id. at 1217 n.1.
263
FLA. STAT. § 98.0751(2)(a) (2020).
264
See supra Part I.A.
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these distinctions, permitting the criminalization of poverty by levying LFOs
and then exacting punishment for nonpayment years after one’s term of
confinement or supervision may have ended.265 Florida’s payment-based felony
disenfranchisement is one key example of this construction. Here, fundamental
rights and criminalization unite, prompting the need for a new standard to
address wealth-based punishments outside of confinement to ensure all have
access to the full extent of citizenship.
Similar to how Griffin’s principles arose from a convergence of both equal
protection and due process,266 a new standard should join the jurisprudence
arising from Griffin and Harper.267 Combining the respective progeny would
establish heightened scrutiny as the proper review for wealth-based criminal
punishments that burden fundamental rights.268 This convergence employs the
due process review of “fairness of relations between the criminal defendant and
the State under the Due Process Clause” and “the question [of] whether the State
has invidiously denied . . . a substantial benefit available to another . . . under
the Equal Protection Clause.”269 Griffin has made clear that no one should be
obligated to purchase access to their rights.270 Its holding has extended past
confinement-based punishments previously271 and may not be narrowed to “easy
slogans or a pigeonhole analysis.”272 Rather, such a system would embody a
similar vein as M.LB. v. S.L.J., recognizing that although states need not account
for all disparities, there must be greater scrutiny of laws which permit
deprivation of fundamental rights—such as the franchise—to turn on one’s
ability to pay.273
The “passage of time has heightened rather than weakened” the need to
“mitigate . . . disparate treatment of indigents in the criminal process.”274 Thus,
the time must come for the Supreme Court to address these restoration
frameworks, as Florida is not the only state permitting payment to punish by
265

See supra Part II.
See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (plurality opinion) (“Consequently at all stages of the
proceedings the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.”).
267
See id.; Harper v. Va. Bd. of Educ., 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
268
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983).
269
Id.
270
Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18 (plurality opinion).
271
See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 111 (1996); see also Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397–98 (1971)
(striking down a Texas law that required criminal defendants unable to satisfy monetary punishments to face
incarceration).
272
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666.
273
See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 123–24.
274
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241 (1970).
266
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erecting a barrier to the ballot box.275 As Justice Sotomayor noted in her dissent
in Raysor v. Desantis, later consolidated into the Jones case, “A case implicating
the franchise of almost a million people is exceptionally important . . . to warrant
review.”276 She added that “this Court’s inaction continues a trend of condoning
disenfranchisement”—an inaction that cannot remain.277
D. Applying This New Standard to Florida
If held to heightened scrutiny, Florida’s law—and similar restoration
schemes employed in other states—would fail. Throughout the Jones litigation,
Florida maintained that its purpose in conditioning rights restoration on full
payment was to ensure all felons “fully repair the harm that they have wrought
on society,” secure the collection of payments, and reduce administrative
costs.278 Heightened scrutiny would require the state to demonstrate that
alternative measures would not adequately satisfy its interests in punishment and
fee collection when refusing to re-enfranchise former felons who have made
“sufficient bona fide efforts to pay.”279 To ignore alternative means of fulfilling
the state’s interests280 and maintain this conditional payment system would do
nothing more than deprive an individual of their fundamental right to the
franchise “simply because, through no fault of [their] own, [they] cannot pay.”281
As the Court wrote in Bearden v. Georgia, “[s]uch a deprivation would be
contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”282
Although the state may have a “fundamental interest in appropriately punishing
persons . . . who violate its criminal laws,”283 this will not justify specifically
targeting those with a genuine inability to pay whilst providing no alternative
routes to achieve rights restoration. In this instance, the state’s interest in
ensuring the payment of restitution and fees, rehabilitation of former felons, and
punishment would not carry the day.

275
Although this Comment aims to utilize Florida’s system as a prime example of the constitutional
problems inherent in pay-to-vote systems, it is important to highlight that several other states employ similar
statutes. See LOVE & SCHLUSSEL, supra note 67, at 4; see also supra Part II (discussing alternative rights
restoration schemes throughout the country).
276
Raysor v. Desantis, 140 S. Ct. 2600, 2602 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
277
Id. at 2603.
278
State Defendant’s Brief on Appeal, supra note 32, at 28.
279
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983).
280
See supra Part II (discussing alternative rights restoration schemes throughout the country).
281
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672–73.
282
Id. at 673.
283
Id. at 669.
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First, payment-based restoration does not satisfy the state’s interest in
collecting payment. For those genuinely unable to pay, LFO requirements will
not suddenly make payment forthcoming.284 Out of the 1.5 million former felons
in Florida, seventy-seven percent “have otherwise completed [other] terms of
their sentence[]” but still owe an LFO of some degree.285 Further, it is estimated
based on county data that seventy percent of felons who have completed all
terms apart from LFOs were represented by state appointed counsel for
indigency.286 Knowing that brushes with the justice system tend to only
exacerbate poverty, the number of former felons with a genuine inability to pay
likely amounts to a similar percentage. Thus, such a requirement does nothing
“more than punish[] a person for his poverty,” as the state knows this money
will not be forthcoming.287
Further eroding the significance of the interest in fee collection, the state
does not actually receive the full amounts as required by the law.288 Particularly,
SB 7066 has not aided in the collection of restitution, nor has it allowed for full
payment of the owed amounts through its transfer of LFOs to collection
agencies.289 Its method of collection does not even require the felon to satisfy
the exact dollar amount.290 Additionally, the manner of collection imposes
additional barriers, as many counties institute a $25 fee just to enroll in a
payment plan.291 If the judgment is turned over to a collection agency, these
organizations “routinely charge fees of up to [forty percent] and remit to the
county only the net amount remaining after deducting the fee.”292 Thus, even if
an individual is genuinely able to pay their LFOs entirely, the state does not
receive the full amount SB 7066 claims it requires.293
This is not to say there would not be a constitutionally sound manner of
enacting a restoration scheme to serve the state’s interest in collecting LFOs
through less restrictive means. Several other states employ statutes that would
pass muster under this new standard of review. For example, Iowa utilizes two
separate restoration paths, distinguished only between non-violent felonies and

284
Id. at 670 (“Revoking the probation of someone who through no fault of his own is unable to make
restitution will not make restitution suddenly forthcoming.”).
285
Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016, 1066–67 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (Jordan, J., dissenting).
286
Id. at 1067.
287
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 671.
288
Jones, 975 F.3d at 1069–70 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
289
Id.
290
See id. at 1070.
291
Id. at 1069.
292
Id.
293
Id.
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felonies including homicide and related crimes.294 Those within the non-violent
category receive automatic restoration following discharge from confinement or
supervision, and those within the “Homicide and Related Crimes” category are
required to pay their LFOs.295 However, once enrolled in a payment plan, these
individuals are able to register to vote, avoiding indefinite disenfranchisement
and providing an alternate route to political participation.296
Similarly, the state of Washington employs three avenues to obtain
enfranchisement that are distinct from full payment of LFOs.297 First, if the
individual has been convicted of either a federal or out-of-state crime, then
voting rights are “restored as long as the individual is not” incarcerated.298
Second, if an individual has completed their term of supervision, the right to
vote is provisionally restored and only revoked if the person has willfully failed
to “comply with the terms of his or her order to pay” LFOs.299 Third, one may
receive restoration “five years after release from [state] custody and completion
of all non-financial obligations of the sentence.”300 All of Washington’s options
offer an opportunity for the state to collect some payment whilst permitting
restoration regardless of one’s ability to pay. Florida—and those states which
employ similar laws—should seek to mimic other states’ systems if it wishes to
satisfy its interests without invidiously operating a scheme grounded on
discriminatory distinctions.
VI. HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY WOULD HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR BOTH
INDIVIDUALS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
In Reynolds v. Sims, the Supreme Court noted that “[i]t has been repeatedly
recognized that all qualified voters have a constitutionally protected right to
vote. . . . To the extent that a citizen’s right to vote is debased, he is that much
less a citizen.”301 Such a debasement has negative implications for both the
individuals who must suffer the punishment and for the preservation of
American democracy. Thus, to establish heightened scrutiny as the proper
review for laws which enact criminal punishment upon fundamental rights
would memorialize this country’s commitment to access to the polls, regardless

294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301

Voting Rights Restoration, supra note 86.
Id.
Id.
LOVE & SCHLUSSEL, supra note 67, at 12–13.
WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.08.520(1) (2020).
Id. at (2)(a).
LOVE & SCHLUSSEL, supra note 67, at 12–13; see WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.637(2)(a) (2020).
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554, 567 (1964).
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of one’s pocketbook. Accordingly, section A discusses how permitting former
felons to register despite outstanding LFOs would reduce recidivism rates and
encourage rehabilitation and reintegration to society—fulfilling the most
important goals of our criminal justice system. Section B examines how
heightened scrutiny for wealth-based restoration laws would positively impact
American democracy and begin to heal the citizenry divides these barriers have
fostered.
A. Eliminating Barriers to the Franchise Would Be Transformative for the
Individual
When discussing widespread changes to our criminal justice system, the
default view is to examine such an issue from the macro level. However,
conditional-payment rights restoration laws are individual in their operation. A
formerly incarcerated woman described the impact disenfranchisement had on
her life as follows:
It’s just like a little salt in the wound. . . . [Y]ou’re trying to be a good
taxpayer and be a homeowner. . . . Just one little vote, right? But that
means a lot to me. . . . It’s just loss after loss. . . . [Y]ou telling me that
I’m still really bad because I can’t [vote] is like making it sting again.
It’s like haven’t I paid enough?302

For so many, “[d]isenfranchisement can . . . be seen as an extension of the
criminal label,” representing a sort of “civil death” and communicating to both
the offender and greater society that this individual has been cast out.303
Rosemary McCoy, a Florida native and one of the plaintiffs in Jones,304
described disenfranchisement as “bondage,” positing that “[w]e are living in
captivity in 2020, and when we can’t vote, [we] are definitely in captivity
because [we] don’t have a voice.”305 She described it as akin to slavery, stating
that by barring restoration the state “put [former felons] back into that same type
of mentality.”306 Ms. McCoy’s likening has similarly been expressed by
Michelle Alexander in The New Jim Crow:
302
JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 4 (2006).
303
Guy Padraic Hamilton-Smith & Matt Vogel, The Violence of Voicelessness: The Impact of Felony
Disenfranchisement on Recidivism, 22 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 407, 415 (2012).
304
See Jones Consolidated Brief, supra note 10, at 8.
305
Lawrence Mower & Langston Taylor, Amendment Four Was Supposed to Let Thousands of Felons
Vote. Most Won’t. What Happened?, MIA. HERALD, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/
state-politics/article246273100.html (Oct. 10, 2020).
306
Id.
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Once you’re labeled a felon, the old forms of discrimination—
employment discrimination, housing discrimination, denial of the right
to vote, denial of educational opportunity, denial of food stamps and
other public benefits, and exclusion from jury service—are suddenly
legal. As a criminal, you have scarcely more rights . . . than a black
man living in Alabama at the height of Jim Crow.307

These old forms of discrimination cannot continue to exercise such control over
our citizenry when founded upon such an arbitrary notion unrelated to the
exercise of voting rights.
In perpetrating the civil death and exclusion of so many of its citizens, the
state’s interest in rehabilitation and deterrence are not being met. In Jones,
Florida argued that requiring full payment of LFOs would ensure former felons
repaid their debt to society, concluding that payment-based rights restoration
was necessary for post-conviction rehabilitation.308 However, paying to vote not
only does little to rehabilitate those with prior convictions, but also encourages
further recidivism. If this barrier to participation were to be eroded when faced
with heightened scrutiny, then the tide could begin to turn for so many of these
individuals. They would no longer be burdened by these financial obligations
nor from the haunting past of their criminal conviction—permitting greater
reintegration into society after incarceration.
Payment-based rights restoration does not tend to make society whole again
following a criminal infraction, nor does it encourage deterrence. Rather, it
contributes to higher rates of recidivism. As noted earlier, these payment-based
schemes serve as yet another form of how the state aims to criminalize
poverty.309 Thus, they often have the opposite impact than intended, leading
many former offenders to feel ostracized from their communities and prompting
them to return to criminal activity as a way to satisfy their large LFO amounts.310
Additionally, due to the scheme’s near invisible nature, it does not tend to deter
future crimes.311 The Supreme Court recognized this in Bearden when reviewing

307

MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS

2 (2012).
308
State Defendant’s Brief on Appeal, supra note 32, at 28 (“[T]he State surely has a legitimate interest
in promoting the rule of law by insisting that all felons fully repair the harm they have wrought on society before
being allowed to vote.”).
309
See McCormack, supra note 42, at 227.
310
See Hamilton-Smith & Vogel, supra note 303, at 415; see also COMFORT, supra note 44, at 182 (noting
how many formerly incarcerated individuals utilize the “oddly beneficial aspects of the penitentiary,” such as
job placement and mental health services, in the absence of social welfare institutions).
311
The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and “The Purity of the Ballot Box,”
102 HARV. L. REV. 1300, 1307 (1989); see also The Daily, supra note 70 (including an interview with a former
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a Georgia law that revoked probation for failure to pay restitution, noting “such
a policy may have the perverse effect of inducing the probationer to use illegal
means to acquire funds to pay” to avoid further punishment.312
These trends toward recidivism have been supported by data across the
country. A study in Washington State demonstrated that payment of LFOs
intensified the already existent problems with re-entry for those with felony
convictions by reducing income, “worsening credit ratings,” deterring efforts to
acquire either employment or educational opportunities, “creating incentives to
avoid work,” and trapping those within the criminal justice system by making it
more difficult to obtain restoration of voting rights or “to seal one’s criminal
record.”313 Additionally, several studies across the country all found that LFO
debt can lead to greater recidivism either through a turn to illegal methods to
obtain finances or through reincarceration for failure to make payments.314
Not only would elimination of payment-based restoration aid deterrence, but
it would also further reintegrate individuals back into society by permitting
participation in the political process irrespective of one’s financial resources.
One of the key goals of the American criminal justice system is to promote
rehabilitation of offenders—a goal that cannot be achieved whilst systematically
preventing those who are too poor to avoid access to the ballot box.315
Particularly, many former offenders have affirmed the importance of the right to
vote in reintegration. For example, one formerly incarcerated Florida man
explained how his return to society had been difficult in terms of securing
employment and moving into his own home.316 However, he noted his hope for
the ability to make change in his community—a hope fostered by the passing of
Amendment Four and later curtailed by the passage of SB 7066—offering that
“[t]he voting thing is the most important. . . . That’s what creates that voice for
people like ex-felons.”317 In just the first three months of 2019 following
Amendment Four’s passage, voter registration of formerly incarcerated

felon who explains he had not thought about disenfranchisement when he was convicted).
312
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671 (1983).
313
KATHERINE A. BECKETT, ALEXES M. HARRIS & HEATHER EVANS, THE ASSESSMENT AND
CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS IN WASHINGTON STATE 4–5 (2008).
314
Annie Harper, Callie Ginapp, Tommaso Bardelli, Alyssa Grimshaw, Marissa Justen, Alaa
Mohamedali, Isiah Thomas & Lisa Puglisi, Debt, Incarceration, and Re-Entry: A Scoping Review, AM. J. CRIM.
JUST. 250, 267 (2020).
315
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 111 (1958) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Such penal methods seek to achieve
. . . that society should make every effort to rehabilitate the offender and restore him as a useful member of
society . . . .”).
316
Mazzei, supra note 71.
317
Id.
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individuals increased tenfold.318 The testimony from one individual who had
registered during that time perfectly incapsulates the transformative potential of
a new standard: they submitted, “I felt like part of America again.”319
B. Eliminating Barriers to the Franchise Would Be Transformative for
American Democracy
Universal suffrage has been an American promise since the Founding. In
Federalist No. 57, James Madison declared the following:
Who are to be the electors of federal representatives? Not the rich,
more than the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant; not the
haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of
obscurity and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great
body of people of the United States.320

Nearly every state constitution has emphasized the promise of the Founding,
including statements guaranteeing the franchise to its citizens.321 By the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, such a textual legacy was solidified,322
despite its grant still being out of reach for so many.323 Throughout American
history and to the present day, the right to vote has become ubiquitous with the
grant of American citizenship, as the “central pillar of liberal citizenship” is
political participation.324
The number of individuals being excluded from the democratic process due
to disenfranchisement is staggering. Throughout the country, 6.1 million people
318

Morris, supra note 116, at 2.
Lawrence Mower & Langston Taylor, Florida Ruled Felons Must Pay to Vote. Now, It Doesn’t Know
How Many Can, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.tampabay.com/news/florida-politics/elections/
2020/10/07/florida-ruled-felons-must-pay-to-vote-now-it-doesnt-know-how-many-can.
320
THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison).
321
KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, SIDNEY VERBA & HENRY E. BRADY, THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS:
UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 46 (2012).
322
Jeffrey Rosen & Tom Donnelly, America’s Unfinished Second Founding, ATL. (Oct. 19, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/10/americas-unfinished-second-founding/411079/ (“While
the 1878 Framers succeeded in creating the most durable form of government in history, it’s only after [the
Fourteenth Amendment] that the Constitution fully protected the liberty and equality promised in the Declaration
of Independence.”).
323
We have yet to achieve the full promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, as reflected by the
discrimination that continues to exist throughout this country and exemplified by the pay-to-vote restoration
schemes described in this Comment.
324
See Jason Schall, The Consistency of Felon Disenfranchisement with Citizenship Theory, 22 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 53, 69 (2006). The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services even includes voting as one
of the important reasons to consider U.S. citizenship. See Should I Consider U.S. Citizenship?, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGR. SERVS., uscis.gov/citizenship/learn-about-citizenship/should-i-consider-us-citizenship (July 5,
2020).
319
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are estimated to be disenfranchised as a result of a felony conviction; this
accounts for one out of every forty adults.325 States that impose postconfinement disenfranchisement make up over half of the entire disenfranchised
population.326 Florida accounts for roughly half of this national total with “1.5
million individuals disenfranchised post-sentence.”327 Barring large segments of
the population from the ballot box—over two percent of the total voting
population nationally and ten percent of the voting population in Florida—is a
poison to American democracy.328 Accordingly, the elimination of paymentbased restoration must be accomplished if we are ever to heal the citizenry divide
disenfranchisement has created and work toward universal suffrage.
First, pay-to-vote felony disenfranchisement has delineated two classes of
citizenry operating within our country: (1) those with means to exercise control,
and (2) those without, who are unable to obtain access to the ballot box. Political
scientist Katherine Irene Pettus explains felony disenfranchisement in America
has “institutionalize[d] a fractionalized national polity” from which two distinct
groups emerge—one of the fully franchised citizens who enjoy equal
participation within our political process and another comprising those who are
disenfranchised and unable to legally participate in American democracy.329 In
this model, the first polity essentially “take[s] turns ruling” over those who are
permanently disenfranchised.330 The ruling class may relish in the positive
impacts of their citizenship whilst disenfranchised felons remain indefinitely
exempted from asserting any political power.331
To worsen the plight of the disenfranchised, “elected officials [often] feel
little pressure” from non-voters, disallowing such a constituency to advance any
causes or elect any officials that may gravely affect their respective
communities.332 This does not merely persist at the federal level. For example,
those with children are unable to influence their local school boards.333 Without
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See Kelli Jo Griffin, I Was Arrested for Voting, ACLU (Nov. 7, 2014, 12:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/
blog/speakeasy/i-was-arrested-voting. Kelli is the mother of four children and a frequent volunteer at her child’s
school and at a women’s crisis center. Id. She was convicted of a nonviolent drug charge in 2008 and told that
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the right to vote, former felons genuinely unable to pay LFOs are unable to
“exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner” and thus unable to
preserve their “other basic civil and political rights.”334 This nation must end the
contradictory notion of holding citizens accountable in the criminal justice
system for legal violations whilst denying them influence over those same
laws.335
Payment-based restoration additionally creates a double-citizenship identity
in which disenfranchised individuals cannot vote in national elections as a result
of being disenfranchised for felonies via their state citizenship. Prior to the Civil
War, American citizenship was generally thought of as derivative of the states,
permitting each locale to “define citizenship and qualify electors for state and
national office on their own terms” as “the status of national citizenship
remained at best vague . . . [with] the Constitution mention[ing] it without
defining what it was.”336 From the Fourteenth Amendment emerged a new
national citizenship, memorializing that individuals were citizens of both the
nation and their respective state.337 As a result, states have utilized this dual
citizenship identity to prescribe various ways to limit the privileges endowed by
one’s national citizenship, delineating “free American citizens . . . who, as a
result of their state identity, are not ‘qualified voters’ for the purposes of national
elections.”338 So long as payment-based restoration persists, this contradictory
premise will continue to damage American democracy, leaving former felons in
a wake of confusion and relegation for one reason—a genuine inability to pay.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen an eligible citizen misses an
opportunity to vote, the opportunity is gone forever; the vote cannot later be

arrested for voter fraud and eventually acquitted. Id. However, she remains disenfranchised, pleading, “I am a
changed person. I should be able to vote in things regarding my child’s school, regarding my community,
regarding things that are happening in my life because that affects me.” Id.
334
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335
Gideon Yaffe, Give Felons and Prisoners the Right to Vote, WASH. POST (July 26, 2016), https://www.
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079da_story.html.
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Cammett, supra note 73 (examining how state-enacted barriers to enfranchisement have created a class of
“shadow-citizens”); Figler, supra note 73 (discussing the use of felony disenfranchisement as a method to
disenfranchise Black Americans in the Jim Crow Era).
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cast.”339 When an individual is faced with indefinite disenfranchisement
employed by a system such as Florida’s, they suffer an irreparable harm every
time an election passes them by. For Ms. Raysor and so many others mentioned
throughout this Comment, payment-based restoration has prevented
reintegration back into society whilst doing little to deter future criminal
activity.340 It exacerbates the challenges already present for those with criminal
records, preventing them from receiving public benefits and certain education
and job opportunities—two pathways necessary to accumulate the financial
resources required for rights restoration.341 So many are consigned to civil death
and a lifetime with a criminal label—despite serving their terms of sentence—
due to these looming LFOs. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Jones and
the Supreme Court’s inaction on unconstitutional restoration frameworks cannot
stand.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should address payment-based restoration
schemes that exist throughout the country,342 pioneering a new path forward to
target laws that punish on account of poverty. This new standard should be
founded upon the fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, combining the Court’s progeny in both voting rights and the rights
of criminal defendants to cement an idea it proscribed long ago—all “ought to
obtain right and justice freely, . . . and without being obligated to purchase it.”343
The court system remains the clearest pathway to overturning these
restoration laws grounded in wealth-based discrimination. However, currently,
the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to uphold Florida’s SB 7066 remains the law of
the land, leaving many without relief as election after election passes them by.
Thus, Congress should pass a new kind of Voting Rights Act—one that
safeguards this country’s commitment to accessing the polls regardless of one’s
pocketbook. Although such legislation may be subjected to legal challenges
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from various states and may have difficulty passing due to political wills, each
legislator has a commitment to enact such a law to provide instantaneous relief
for those facing the continuous and irreparable harm that payment-based
restoration has levied upon their lives.
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